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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we must determine whether the 
preemptive force of section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. S 185, applies to bar the 
state-law claims of seven employees of The Stroh Brewery 
Company ("Stroh"). In making this determination, we must 
address a panoply of issues relating to section 301 
preemption, including: (1) whether an agreement negotiated 
between an employer and a labor union with the goal of 
ending a labor dispute constitutes a "collective bargaining 
agreement"; (2) whether state-law claims that rely, in part, 
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on the interpretation of such an agreement are subject to 
section 301 preemption; and (3) whether tort claims alleged 
against both an employer and a labor union comprise a 
"hybrid" action. Because we conclude that each of these 
questions must be answered in the affirmative, we will 
affirm the District Court's judgment. 
 
I. 
 
The appellants, C. David Beidleman, Charles Bogusky, 
Budd Frankenfield, Dale Miller, James Reichenbach, 
Donald Schraden and Larry Wedge (collectively, the 
"employees") appeal the District Court's order dismissing 
their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted. Since the District Court disposed of the 
employees' claims on a motion to dismiss, we must accept 
as true the employees' allegations. Thus, we will base our 
recitation of the facts on the allegations in the complaint. 
See Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Prior to June 30, 1985, the employees worked as truck 
drivers at Stroh's brewery in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania. 
As truck drivers, the employees were members of Teamsters 
Local 773 ("Local 773"), and subject to Local 773's collective 
bargaining agreement with Stroh. On March 22, 1985, 
Stroh notified Local 773 of its intent to terminate its 
trucking operations. The termination was to take effect on 
June 30, 1985. Following this notification, representatives 
of Stroh and Local 773 held three collective bargaining 
sessions in an attempt to reach an agreement concerning 
the impending termination. The meetings failed to produce 
an agreement, and on June 30, 1985, Stroh terminated the 
employees. That same day, the collective bargaining 
agreement between Local 773 and Stroh expired. 
 
On July 1, 1985, the forty-seven truck drivers 
represented by Local 773 initiated an economic strike 
against Stroh. While the strike was ongoing, negotiations 
between Stroh, Local 773 and Teamsters Local 12 ("Local 
12") continued.1 On August 15, 1985, the parties reached 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Stroh's production workers, whose collective bargaining agreement 
also expired on June 30, 1985, refused to cross the picket line set up by 
Local 773. Initially, these production workers were represented by 
Teamsters Local 522; however, during the strike the workers voted to 
replace Local 522 with Local 12. Thus, Local 12 also participated in the 
settlement negotiations. 
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an agreement whereby: (1) the majority of the drivers were 
laid off and given severance payments and other benefits; 
(2) four drivers were retained; and (3) the rest of the drivers 
-- including the seven employees -- were placed on a 
"master seniority list" that provided them with recall rights 
in the event that additional production workers were 
needed, and "endtail" seniority rights in the event that they 
were rehired. The parties reduced this settlement 
agreement to a "closing agreement" ("1985 closing 
agreement"), which Stroh later incorporated into a formal 
contract. The closing agreement was read to the members 
of Local 773, who then voted to end the strike on August 
15, 1985. 
 
During 1994 and 1995, Stroh began to hire "temporary to 
full time" workers for its production department. Soon 
thereafter, Local 773's Vice President, William Hontz, 
advised Stroh that these hires violated the recall rights of 
the employees under the 1985 closing agreement. On 
August 21, 1995, Stroh's Human Resources Manager Mike 
Gray sent the employees a letter offering them 
reemployment in the production department. On April 8, 
1996, Stroh rehired the employees. 
 
The employees allege that following their rehire, Stroh, 
Local 773, Local 12 and certain of their employees or agents 
engaged in a pattern of conduct that had the purpose and 
effect of denying them their rights under the 1985 closing 
agreement. According to the employees, Stroh violated their 
recall rights under the 1985 closing agreement by hiring 
the "temporary to full time" production workers during 
1994 and 1995. Moreover, by refusing to grant the 
employees retroactive seniority upon rehire in 1996, the 
employees maintain that Stroh violated the "endtail" 
seniority provision of the 1985 closing agreement. The 
employees contend that the appellees have repeatedly 
denied having knowledge of the whereabouts and/or 
existence of the 1985 closing agreement, and have refused 
to honor its terms.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In their brief, the employees state that during June of 1996, Local 12 
advised them that it was not aware of the 1985 agreement and that 
unless the employees could produce a copy of the agreement, they could 
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On June 21, 1997, the employees filed a complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, 
alleging that the conduct of Stroh and the other appellees 
amounted to: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation; (2) tortious 
interference with contractual relations; and (3) civil 
conspiracy. The appellees removed the action to the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on the grounds that section 301 of the LMRA 
preempted the employees' claims. The employees filed a 
subsequent motion to remand the case to state court, 
which the District Court denied. 
 
The District Court granted the appellees' joint motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded, 
"[b]ecause . . . none of plaintiffs' claims can meaningfully be 
described as being independent of a collective-bargaining 
agreement . . . all of plaintiffs' claims are completely 
preempted by section 301." Beidleman v. Stroh Brewery Co., 
1998 WL 254979, *5 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Since the parties did 
not dispute that the employees' claims were untimely if 
preempted by section 301, the court dismissed the 
employees' complaint with prejudice. Id. 
 
The employees now appeal the District Court's order 
granting the appellees' joint motion to dismiss, and its 
order denying their motion to remand. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review a 
district court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. See 
Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. 
 
The employees challenge the District Court's order 
dismissing their complaint on three grounds: (1) the 1985 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
not file any grievances relating to the 1985 seniority issues set forth in 
the complaint. Likewise, the employees contend that Local 773 informed 
them that its "files had been purged," that it did not have a copy of the 
1985 closing agreement, and that without the agreement it would not 
assist the employees in enforcing their alleged rights. Finally, the 
employees assert that Stroh notified them that "there was no shutdown 
agreement available" and that their seniority would be based on the 
respective dates of their re-hire in 1996. 
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closing agreement was a private employment contract, not 
a collective bargaining agreement, and thus was not subject 
to section 301 of the LMRA; (2) adjudication of the state-law 
claims alleged in the complaint does not require 
interpretation of the 1985 closing agreement; thus they are 
not preempted by section 301; and (3) the state-law claims 
do not constitute a "hybrid" action; thus the six-month 
statute of limitations articulated in DelCostello v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171- 
72 (1983), does not apply. We will address each argument 
in turn. 
 
A. 
 
At the outset, we must determine whether the 1985 
closing agreement is a "collective bargaining agreement" for 
purposes of section 301 preemption, for if it is not, we lack 
subject matter jurisdiction over the employees' claims.3 See 
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. United 
Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1631 (1998). The employees 
argue that the 1985 closing agreement is a "private 
employment contract" that cannot provide the basis for 
preemption. They note that the collective bargaining 
agreement between Local 773 and Stroh expired on June 
30, 1985; thus, when the 1985 closing agreement was 
memorialized on August 15, 1985, they were not 
represented by a union. In addition, the employees argue 
that the purpose of the 1985 closing agreement was to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Stroh contends that the employees waived the right to argue that the 
1985 closing agreement is an individual contract by failing to raise the 
issue below. However, "the existence of an agreement between a labor 
organization and an employer is, for Section 301 purposes, a 
jurisdictional fact." Local 336, American Federation of Musicians v. 
Bonatz, 475 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1973). Thus, because this issue 
directly impacts our subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, it is 
appropriate for us to address it here. See State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Although 
[plaintiff] did not raise this jurisdictional issue below, we may address 
it 
for the first time on appeal `because the limited subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts is so fundamental a concern in our 
system.' ") (quoting Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
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confer employment rights upon a "small group" of truck 
drivers, which renders it more akin to a private employment 
contract than a collective bargaining agreement. As 
support, the employees rely on the Supreme Court's 
decision in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 
(1987). 
 
In Caterpillar, former salaried employees of Caterpillar 
Tractor Company filed suit alleging breach of individual 
employment contracts. The contracts consisted of oral and 
written representations made by Caterpillar, promising the 
employees alternative employment opportunities in the 
event that the company had to close the facility where they 
worked. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 388-89. Caterpillar 
made these representations individually to each of the 
employees, and they were outside the scope of the collective 
bargaining agreement. See id. at 389. After Caterpillar 
breached its promise, the employees filed suit under 
California law. See id. at 390. In holding that the 
employees' breach of contract claims were not preempted 
by section 301, the Court stated: 
 
       [the employees] allege that Caterpillar has entered into 
       and breached individual employment contracts with 
       them. Section 301 says nothing about the content or 
       validity of individual employment contracts. It is true 
       that [the employees], bargaining unit members at the 
       time of the plant closing, possessed substantial rights 
       under the collective agreement, and could have 
       brought suit under S 301. As masters of the complaint, 
       however, they chose not to do so. 
 
Id. at 394-95. 
 
We believe that the 1985 closing agreement is readily 
distinguishable from the agreement at issue in Caterpillar. 
Most significantly, the 1985 closing agreement was 
bargained for and negotiated by Stroh and the labor 
unions, not Stroh and the employees individually. The fact 
that the collective bargaining agreement between Local 773 
and Stroh expired on June 30 did not remove Local 773's 
status as the employees' majority representative. See 
Hajoca Corp. v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 1169, 1173 (3d Cir. 1989) 
("The presumption of [a union's] majority status survives 
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the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.. . ."); 
International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental 
Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 772 (3d Cir. 
1988) ("Upon the expiration of a collective bargaining 
agreement, the employer may not withdraw recognition of 
the union unilaterally unless it has reasonable, good faith 
grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority 
status"). In addition, the purpose of the 1985 closing 
agreement was not merely to confer benefits upon a"small 
group" of truck drivers. Rather, it served the dual purpose 
of providing the forty-seven members of Local 773 with 
employment rights and ending their economic strike against 
Stroh. Taken together, we find these factors sufficient to 
distinguish the 1985 closing agreement from the individual 
employment contracts in Caterpillar. 
 
Moreover, for purposes of section 301, a labor contract 
need not be a "collective bargaining agreement" per se: 
 
       It is enough that this is clearly an agreement between 
       employers and labor organizations significant to the 
       maintenance of labor peace between them. It came into 
       being as a means satisfactory to both sides for 
       terminating a protracted strike and labor dispute. Its 
       terms affect the working conditions of the employees of 
       both respondents. It effected the end of picketing and 
       resort by labor organizations to other economic 
       weapons, and restored strikers to their jobs. It resolved 
       a controversy arising out of, and importantly and 
       directly affecting, the employment relationship. Plainly 
       it falls within S 301(a). 
 
Retail Clerks International Association v. Lion Dry Goods, 
Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28 (1962). 
 
In their brief and at oral argument, the employees failed 
to distinguish satisfactorily the 1985 closing agreement 
from that described in Lion Dry Goods. Both were entered 
into by the employer and the labor unions to establish 
labor peace, and both resolved a controversy arising out of 
the employment relationship. Accordingly, we reject the 
employees' contention that the 1985 closing agreement is 
not a collective bargaining agreement. 
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B. 
 
We now must turn to the question whether section 301 
preempts the employees' state-law claims. The employees 
dispute the District Court's conclusion that resolution of 
their state-law claims is dependent upon the terms in the 
1985 closing agreement. Specifically, they contend that 
their claims relate to the simple existence of the agreement, 
and that "at no point in [their] complaint[do they] seek to 
have the court interpret any substantive provision of the 
agreement." Appellant's Brief at 14. 
 
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides: 
 
       Suits for violations of contracts between an employer 
       and a labor organization representing employees in an 
       industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in 
       any District Court of the United States having 
       jurisdiction over the parties. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 185(a). Section 301 is not only jurisdictional, "it 
authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for 
the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements." 
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). In light of this 
mandate, the Supreme Court has held that any state-law 
cause of action for violation of a collective bargaining 
agreement is entirely preempted by section 301 of the 
LMRA, see Avco Corp. v. International Association of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 559 (1968); 
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962), 
because: 
 
       [T]he subject matter of S 301(a) `is peculiarly one that 
       calls for uniform law.' . . . The possibility that 
       individual contract terms might have different 
       meanings under state and federal law would inevitably 
       exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation 
       and administration of collective agreements. Because 
       neither party could be certain of the rights which it 
       had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating 
       an agreement would be made immeasurably more 
       difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract 
       provisions in such a way as to contain the same 
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       meaning under two more systems of law which might 
       someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. 
 
Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103. 
 
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), the 
Supreme Court articulated the standard for determining 
whether a plaintiff 's state-law claims are preempted by 
section 301. There, the Court stated: 
 
       When resolution of a state-law claim is substantially 
       dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective 
       bargaining agreement, that claim must either be 
       treated as a S 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by 
       federal-labor contract law. 
 
Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220; see also id. at 213 (state- 
law claims are preempted if "inextricably intertwined with 
consideration of the terms of the labor contract").4 In Lingle 
v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), 
the Supreme Court further defined this standard, stating 
that: 
 
       if resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the 
       meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the 
       application of state law . . . is preempted and federal 
       labor-law principles . . . must be employed to resolve 
       the dispute. 
 
Id. at 405-06. 
 
However, section 301 does not preempt every dispute 
that tangentially concerns the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211. 
"[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of 
dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining 
agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law 
litigation plainly does not require the claim to be 
extinguished." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 
(1994) (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, n.12 ("A collective- 
bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information 
such as rate of pay and other economic benefits that might 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1989), we concluded that 
the phrase "inextricably intertwined" was equivalent to "substantial 
dependence." Id. at 27 n. 8. 
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be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker 
prevailing in a state-law suit is entitled.")). 
 
Guided by these principles, we turn to an analysis of the 
employees' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, tortious 
interference and civil conspiracy. 
 
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove the 
following elements to succeed on a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim: 
 
       (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance 
       thereof, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient 
       will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by 
       the recipient upon the misrepresentation and (5) 
       damage to the recipient as the proximate result. 
 
Moffat Enter., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169, 1174 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (quoting Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 
285 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 1971)). 
 
The employees maintain that in pleading this count, they 
at no point seek to have the court interpret any substantive 
provisions of the 1985 closing agreement. However, in 
Count I alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, the 
employees claim: 
 
       P 71 - Plaintiffs believe, and therefore aver, that 
       Defendants are fraudulently misrepresenting to the 
       Plaintiffs that the Defendants are not bound by the 
       terms of the 1985 closing agreement, when Defendants 
       in fact know, or should be aware, that said closing 
       agreement is a binding document even if a signed copy 
       of the same is not physically produced. 
 
Appendix ("App."), Tab 3 at 14 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
"misrepresentation" at issue is the appellees' refusal to 
acknowledge the validity of the 1985 closing agreement. 
Clearly, for a court to decide the merits of this claim it 
must interpret those terms in the agreement setting forth 
the appellees' obligations, for if the 1985 closing agreement 
does not contain terms that bind the appellees, then no 
"misrepresentation" exists. 
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The employees' reliance on Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. 
McCandless, 50 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) and our recent 
decision in Voilas v. General Motors Corp., 170 F.3d 367 (3d 
Cir. 1999) is unavailing. 
 
In McCandless, the employer made the following 
representation to its employees, which was later alleged to 
be fraudulent: 
 
       This is our PERSONAL GUARANTEE and your LEGAL 
       CONTRACT that you . . . will have a job here . . . as 
       long as you perform your work satisfactorily, follow up 
       our customary rules, and we are economically able to 
       operate this institution successfully and work is 
       available. This GUARANTEE is given to you because of 
       the FALSE UNION RUMOR that you will lose your job 
       if the Union loses the election. . . . This is our 
       WRITTEN LEGAL CONTRACT AND GUARANTEE TO 
       YOU. . . . 
 
Id. at 221 (emphasis in original). This personal guarantee 
was separate from the collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties. In holding that section 301 did not 
preempt the employees' fraud claims, we noted that"[t]his 
is not a situation . . . where the alleged tort is a violation 
of duties assumed in the collective bargaining agreement." 
Id. at 232. Rather, we concluded that resolution of the 
claim would require a court to examine only the employers' 
behavior, motivation and statements, which "does not 
substantially depend upon the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement." Id. 
 
Likewise, in Voilas, the employer, GM, made the following 
representation in a newsletter to its employees: 
 
       Believe me when I say that all talk about potentially 
       keeping [the Trenton plant] open is false optimism 
       originating right from this plant. No one at our 
       divisional executive level is actively working on a 
       scenario that could possibly keep Trenton open . . .. I 
       know I am being blunt, but I know there are many 
       people making difficult decisions regarding retirement. 
       I would not want any rumors influencing those 
       decisions. The worst thing anyone could do would be to 
       turn down one of the best mutual retirement programs 
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       available because of a rumor and then later lose what 
       is available when the plant closes. 
 
See Voilas, 170 F.3d at 371. As a result, nearly 200 
employees accepted an early retirement package that had 
been collectively bargained for by the employer and the 
union. See id. Two days after the deadline for accepting the 
early retirement package, GM announced plans to pursue 
alternatives to closing the Trenton plant--which ultimately 
it did keep open. See id. The employees then brought suit 
under New Jersey law alleging that the representation in 
the newsletter was fraudulent. 
 
We began our section 301 analysis by noting that the 
plaintiffs' complaint alleged only that " `GM intentionally 
misrepresented . . . the status of the plant closing. . . for 
the purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to quit their jobs and 
accept the [early retirement agreement],' " and that it did 
not allege that GM made a misrepresentation concerning 
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 376 (quoting 
App. at 187-88). Thus, we concluded: 
 
       [T]he fraud claim in this case is not directly based 
       upon the collective bargaining agreements in force 
       between the parties, nor will the resolution of the 
       elements of common law fraud require the 
       interpretation of those bargaining agreements. 
       Plaintiffs, in pursuing their fraud claim, are seeking 
       vindication of a `nonnegotiable right . . .' that is 
       " `independent" of rights under the collective bargaining 
       agreement.' Resolution of the common law fraud issue 
       in this action will not frustrate the uniform 
       development of federal law governing labor contract 
       interpretation nor allow the employees to sidestep the 
       grievance machinery by dressing up a contract 
       grievance as a tort. Consequently, there is no ground 
       for section 301 preemption in this case. 
 
Id. at 378 (internal citations omitted). 
 
There are a number of factors that differentiate the 
employees' fraudulent misrepresentation claim from those 
alleged in McCandless and Voilas. Chief among them is the 
fact that the employees' claim stems directly from a 
collective bargaining agreement, whereas the claims in 
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McCandless and Voilas arose from an agreement or 
representation that was independent of any collective 
bargaining agreement. While this distinction, standing 
alone, might be insufficient to support a finding of section 
301 preemption, the employees' claim does more. As 
explained previously, to resolve the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim alleged in the present case, a court 
must identify and interpret substantive provisions of the 
1985 closing agreement. Both McCandless and Voilas 
explicitly found that the fraud claims at issue did not 
require such interpretation. See Voilas, 170 F.3d at 378; 
McCandless, 50 F.3d at 232. 
 
Moreover, the essence of the fraud claims in McCandless 
and Voilas is patently different from the claim alleged here. 
In McCandless we stated, "[t]he essence of the employees' 
[fraud] case is proof of justifiable reliance on the separate 
guarantees, not on the collective bargaining agreements." 
McCandless, 50 F.3d at 232; see also Voilas, 170 F.3d at 
377 (finding this description applicable to the fraud claim 
at issue). By contrast, the essence of the present claim is 
that the employees were fraudulently denied their rights 
under of the 1985 closing agreement. Thus, the employees' 
claim implicates the underlying reason for section 301 
preemption, namely, "the need for uniform interpretation of 
contract terms to aid both the negotiation and the 
administration of collective bargaining agreements." Antol v. 
Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Lucas 
Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04). Accordingly, we conclude that it 
is preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. 
 
2. Tortious Interference 
 
The employees insist that their tortious interference claim 
does not call for analysis of the 1985 closing agreement, 
but instead simply requires a court to review a course of 
tortious conduct perpetrated by the appellees. We disagree. 
 
Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff to prove four 
elements in order to establish a claim of tortious 
interference with contractual relations: 
 
       (1) the existence of a contractual relationship; (2) an 
       intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff 
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       by interfering with that contractual relationship; (3) the 
       absence of a privilege or justification for such 
       interference; and (4) damages resulting from the 
       defendant's conduct. 
 
Triffin v. Janssen, 626 A.2d 571, 574 (Pa. Super. 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
 
To satisfy these requirements, the employees allege the 
following: 
 
       P 78 - Plaintiffs believe, and therefore aver, that the 
       Defendants acted intentionally and maliciously, for the 
       express purpose of denying the Plaintiffs all of their 
       contractual rights, including, seniority rights, flowing to 
       the Plaintiffs pursuant to the terms of the 1985 closing 
       agreement. 
 
       P80 - Plaintiffs believe, and therefore aver, that 
       Defendant Local 12, Defendant Jim Maley, and 
       Defendant John Boisitz tortiously interfered with the 
       enforcement of Plaintiff's 1985 closing agreement in 
       order to protect seniority rights of production workers 
       hired prior to April 8, 1996. 
 
       P 81 - Plaintiffs believe, and therefore aver, that 
       Defendant Philip M. DePietro, Jr., Defendant Stephen 
       A. Banus and Defendant Local 773 intentionally and 
       tortiously interfered with the Plaintiff's 1985 closing 
       agreement by refusing to enforce the same and, by 
       refusing to disclose the whereabouts of the same . .. 
 
       P83 - Defendants, acting without privilege or license, 
       wrongfully interfered with Plaintiffs' existing contractual 
       relationships arising out of the 1985 closing agreement 
       by inducing or otherwise causing Local 773 and Stroh's 
       to breach their contractual obligations to Plaintiffs. 
 
       P85 - Plaintiffs believe, and therefore aver, that as a 
       result of the Defendants' reckless, willful and wanton 
       actions and interfering with the Plaintiffs 1985 closing 
       agreement, Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to 
       incur great harm and damages including, . . . , lost of 
       reputation, loss of profits and good will, loss of career 
       status, and loss of earning, benefits, bonuses and 
       fringe benefits. 
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App., Tab 3 at 15-17 (emphasis added). Once again, these 
allegations clearly are "inextricably intertwined" with 
consideration of the terms of the 1985 closing agreement. 
For example, it is impossible to determine whether the 
appellees tortiously interfered by "refusing to enforce" the 
1985 closing agreement without knowing what terms they 
were required to enforce and refused to do so. Similarly, a 
court cannot evaluate the veracity of the employees' claims 
that the appellees "intentionally and maliciously. . . 
den[ied] the Plaintiffs all of their contractual rights" and 
"wrongfully interfered with Plaintiffs' existing contractual 
relationships arising out of the 1985 agreement" without 
knowing to what rights and persons the employees are 
referring. In other words, "[t]he duties imposed and rights 
established through the state tort . . . derive from the rights 
and obligations established by the [collective bargaining] 
contract." Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 217. Thus, resolution 
of the employees' tortious interference claim will inevitably 
involve interpretation of the 1985 closing agreement, which 
mandates preemption by section 301. See Wilkes-Barre 
Publ'g Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, 647 F.2d 
372, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1981) ("where parties to a labor 
dispute are charged with tortious interference with a 
collective bargaining agreement, at least in the absence of 
outrageous or violent conduct, state law causes of action 
are preempted [by section 301]." 
 
3. Civil Conspiracy 
 
The employees' civil conspiracy claim suffers from the 
same defects as their claims of fraudulent 
misrepresentation and tortious interference. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, civil conspiracy is a 
"combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful act 
or criminal act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or 
for an unlawful purpose." Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 
F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing Landau v. Western 
Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank, 282 A.2d 335, 338 (Pa. 1971)). 
 
In support of their claim, the employees allege: 
 
       P89 - Plaintiffs believe, and therefore aver, that the 
       Defendants, acting in concert and for common 
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       purposes and goals, agreed among themselves to 
       commit an unlawful act or to do an otherwise unlawful 
       [sic] act by unlawful means, namely, by conspiring to 
       lie about the existence of the 1985 closing agreement 
       and prevent the Plaintiffs from exercising those 
       contractual rights arising thereunder. 
 
App., Tab 3 at 18. Here, the appellees' "unlawful act" 
involves conspiring to prevent the employees from 
exercising their contractual rights under the 1985 closing 
agreement. Surely, to assess this claim a court will have to 
identify the rights that the appellees allegedly conspired to 
prevent. Therefore, because this claim is predicated upon 
the terms of the 1985 closing agreement, it is preempted by 
section 301. 
 
In sum, to decide the merits of each claim alleged in the 
employees' complaint, a court would have to interpret the 
terms of the 1985 closing agreement to determine what 
rights, relationships or duties it conferred on the parties. 
The employees' contention that their state-law claims relate 
merely to the existence of the 1985 closing agreement is 
contradicted by the allegations in their own complaint. We 
take our cue from Allis-Chalmers, which explained 
"questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement 
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended toflow 
from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by 
reference to uniform federal law." Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. 
at 211. Accordingly, because the employees' claims derive 
from the 1985 closing agreement and "substantially depend 
upon" an analysis of its terms, we conclude that they are 
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. 
 
C. 
 
Having determined that the employees' state-law claims 
are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, we now must 
consider whether the District Court correctly held that the 
employees' complaint was barred by the statute of 
limitations. This question turns on whether the complaint 
constitutes a "hybrid" action. 
 
A "hybrid" section 301 action is one in which a union 
member sues his or her employer for breaching its 
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contractual obligations under the collective bargaining 
agreement and the union for breaching its duty of fair 
representation. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65; United 
Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 
53, 58 (3d Cir. 1994). In DelCostello, the Supreme Court 
held that the six-month statue of limitations established in 
section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
S 160(b), applied to such actions. Id. at 170-71. The Court 
explained: 
 
       In S 10(b) of the NLRA, Congress established a 
       limitations period attuned to what it viewed as the 
       proper balance between the national interest in stable 
       bargaining relationships and finality of private 
       settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside 
       what he views as an unjust settlement under the 
       collective-bargaining system. That is precisely the 
       balance at issue in this case. . . . Accordingly, `[t]he 
       need for uniformity' among procedures followed for 
       similar claims, as well as the clear congressional 
       indication of the proper balance between the interests 
       at stake, counsels the adoption of S 10(b) of the NLRA 
       as the appropriate limitations period for lawsuits such 
       as this. 
 
Id. at 171 (quoting United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 
U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981) (opinion concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 
Here, the District Court characterized the employees' 
action as follows: 
 
       In this case, plaintiffs claims all arise from their 
       contention that their bargaining representative and 
       employer either agreed during collective bargaining to 
       provide plaintiffs with certain seniority rights or 
       fraudulently represented that they had done so. In this 
       regard . . . defendants' characterization of plaintiffs' 
       claims as a classic hybrid action is accurate. The 
       gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that their employer 
       is in breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, which 
       was created in fact or by fraud and estoppel, and that 
       the union defendants have breached their duty of fair 
       representation by either failing to protect plaintiffs' 
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       seniority rights or fraudulently misrepresenting the 
       substance of a collective-bargaining agreement. 
 
Beidleman, 1998 WL 254979 at * 4. We agree with this 
characterization, and conclude that the employees' 
complaint is a hybrid section 301 action.5  
 
Because the employees concede that they filed their 
complaint more than six months after their cause of action 
accrued, see Appendix, Tab 3 at 15 (Complaint P 74); 
Beidleman, 1998 WL 254979 at *3, n. 3, we find that the 
District Court correctly dismissed the employees' claims on 
statute of limitations grounds. 
 
III. 
 
The employees also challenge the District Court's March 
11, 1998 order denying their motion to remand the case to 
state court. The employees contend that, "pursuant to the 
`well pleaded complaint rule,' there was nothing in [the] 
Complaint which would have indicated any basis for 
jurisdiction of the federal courts." Appellants' Brief at 29. 
However, our conclusion that the employees' state-law 
claims are completely preempted by section 301 is 
dispositive of the issues raised in the employees' motion to 
remand. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (1987) ("Once an 
area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any 
claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is 
considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and 
therefore arises under federal law . . . The complete pre- 
emption corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is 
applied primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by 
S 301 of the LMRA") (internal citations omitted). Thus, the 
District Court properly denied the employees' motion to 
remand the case to state court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Indeed, even under the definition acknowledged by the employees, the 
complaint is a hybrid action. In their brief, the employees state: "the 
case 
at bar does not, and could not, be converted to a hybrid action unless 
the averments of [the Complaint] would require the court to interpret 
and apply the substantive contents of a collective bargaining agreement." 
Appellants' Brief at 25 (emphasis added). This is precisely what we 
concluded in Part II.B. 
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IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's order denying the employees' motion to remand and 
its order granting the appellees' joint motion to dismiss. 
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